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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

a.

Introduction.
This is the Reply Brief of the Idaho Transportation Department (the Department).

The Department seeks review of the District Court's decision setting aside an
Administrative Driver's License Suspension (ALS) entered by The Department's Hearing
Examiner.
b.

Characterization of the Issues.
Mr. Broadfoot accepts the characterization of the issue on appeal and does not

offer any additional issues for the Court's consideration. The issue for the Court is
whether there is substantial evidence in the Record as a whole supporting the Hearing
Examiner's decision to suspend Mr. Broadfoot's driving privileges.
II. Argument.
The characterization of the issue on appeal reqUIres the revIewmg court to
consider the Department's Hearing Examiner's Decision to suspend Mr. Broadfoot's
driving privileges as a result of the failure of an evidentiary test for breath alcohol
pursuant to I.C. § lS-S002A.
The question here is not whether the District Court's reVIew of the Hearing
Examiner's decision is supported by evidence in the Record as Broadfoot suggests but is
instead whether the Hearing Examiner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in
the Record. I
The District Court's review should not weigh the evidence differently than that of
the Hearing Examiner, instead the Court should determine whether there is sufficient
1 The Court reviews the agency record independently of the District Court decision, Howard v. Canyon
County Bd. ofCom'rs, 128 Idaho 479,915 F.2d 709 (1996).
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evidence in the Department's Record supporting the conclusion of the Hearing
Examiner.2
The question is not whether the Court would agree with the findings made by the
Hearing Examiner were the Court the finder of fact, but whether there is a reasonable
basis for those findings, Masterson v. Idaho Dept. Transp., 150 Idaho 126, 244 P.3d 625,
627 (Ct. App 2010).
The Hearing Examiner here makes specific reference to the evidence in the
Record on which he relied. The Hearing Examiner attaches significance to the fact that
Mr. Broadfoot's breath alcohol results correlate within .02.

Mr. Broadfoot's breath

alcohol results were .l66 and .149, a correlation of .017. The agreement of the breath
samples strongly refutes the possibility of mouth alcohol affecting the samples. 3
The Idaho State Police Forensic Services Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard
Operating Procedure (IBASOP) specifically addresses the correlation of the breath
alcohol test results. "The results of duplicate breath samples should correlate within .02
to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the individual's breath pathway"
(IBASOP 6.2.2.2 pp. 15-22).
2 The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence,
Marshall v. Idaho Transp. Dept. J37 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d at 669 (Ct. App. 2002).

3

The Hearing Examiner makes specific factual findings based on the Record,
4.

ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2 provides a complete breath alcohol test include two valid breath
samples taken during the testing sequence and proceeded by air blanks.
5. Exhibit 2 notes Broadfoot two subject breath test were within ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2
requirements.
6. ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.2.2.2 notes the results for a duplicate breath sample should correlate
within 0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the subject/individual's breath
pathway ....
7. The Intoxilyzer 5000 EN manual in Section I page 22 provides the 0.02 agreement of two breath
samples taken during the testing sequence ... strongly refute the possibility of ... mouth alcohol ...
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059.
See breath test results R. p. 029.
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The Hearing Examiner also indicates the evidence from the video recording that
he considered sufficient to support his decision.
The video tape of the monitoring period shows Officer Dahlinger in close
physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot, conversing with Mr. Broadfoot and at no time
turning his back to Mr. Broadfoot. 4
The Hearing Examiner's conclusion that Officer Dahlinger had ample opportunity
to use a combination of his senses to determine that an event which could affect the
breath alcohol content did not occur is supported by the Record.
Further, the video recording demonstrates that a belch did not occur. The Hearing
Examiner specifically finds that the since there was no movement in Mr. Broadfoot's
throat mouth or cheeks, it is unlikely that a belch occurred. 5

4

9.

Exhibit A provides during the monitoring period Officer Dahlinger was in close proximity to
Broadfoot, conversed with Broadfoot. and when programming the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN (based
upon the location of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN and Broadfoot), Officer Dahlinger's side and not his
back was towards Broadfoot.
10. Exhibit A demonstrates Officer Dahlinger had ample opportunity to use all of senses to monitor
Broadfoot within ISP Forensic Services SOP § 6.1 requirements.

Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059.

10. Ten seconds prior to Broadfoot's first breath sample. Exhibit A does not show any movement in
Broadfoot's throat, mouth or cheeks to indicate any belching had occurred.
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order, R. p. 059.
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Mr. Broadfoot instead argues that the evidence should not be weighted
considering those factors and conditions identified by the Hearing Examiner but to other
factors like "machine noise.,,6
The Hearing Examiner's findings indicate what information the Hearing
Examiner considered, what weight was placed on that evidence by the Hearing Examiner
and how the Hearing Examiner deliberated to the conclusions made by him. The Hearing
Examiner clearly made factual determinations supported by the Record and which are
binding on the reviewing Court. Urrutia v. Blaine County 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d
738, 742 (2000), "Marshall v. Department of Transp. 137 Idaho 337, 48 P.3d 666 (Ct.
App.2002).
It is the Court's emphasis on other facts in the Record coming to a contrary

conclusion than the Hearing Examiner that is inconsistent with the Court's limited review
of the facts.

By placing different weight on the facts considered by the Hearing

Examiner, the District Court substitutes its judgment for the judgment of the Hearing
Examiner, Marshall at 340.

6

See for example Mr. Broadfoot's arguments at p.17 of the Respondent's Brief:
Further, the District Court did not improperly re-weigh the Moody's credibility
detenninations regarding evidence. Rather, in reviewing the record as a whole, the
District Court properly considered all of the evidence presented, including pieces of
evidence that were ignored by Moody. Specifically, Moody's Findings make no mention
of the circumstances surrounding the monitoring period as evidenced by the video except
to state that Dahlinger's back was towards Broadfoot. R. at 57. He completely ignored
numerous other pieces of evidence specifically mentioned by the District Court, including
the length of time Dahlinger was turned away from Broadfoot, Dahlinger's activities
while he was turned away from Broadfoot, and the loud beeping and humming noises in
the room. R. at 200. The reviewing court is not bound by the agency's factual
detenninations if they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence in the
record. See Wilkinson v. State. 264 P.3d at 682.
The District Court reviewed the same evidence that was available to Moody, much of
which was ignored in Moody's Findings.
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Here, Officer Dahlinger was able to use more than one of his senses to determine
whether an event which may have introduced mouth alcohol to the breath testing sample
occurred. Officer Dahlinger was in close physical proximity, never leaving the side of
Mr. Broadfoot, distinguishing the facts here from the facts of Bennett v. State, Dept. of

Transp., 147 Idaho 141,206 P.3d 505 (Ct. App. 2009).
The Court of Appeals recently considered the circumstances of the Hearing
Examiner's argument of the monitoring period, explaining further the Court's decision in

Bennett. Peck v. State of Idaho, Dept. of Tramp., 2012 Opinion No. 25 Idaho Court of
Appeals, April 30, 2012. There the Court considered the circumstances of the monitoring
period based on the Officer maintaining a close physical proximity to the driver and the
Hearing Examiner's determination of whether a belch occurred.

The facts here are

indistinguishable from those in Peck.
The evidence is clear that while programming the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN, Officer
Dahlinger maintained a sufficient physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot so that his senses
could be employed for purposes of determining whether a mouth alcohol event occurred.
He was engaged with and conversed with Mr. Dahlinger for the entirety of the
monitoring period even though he might have been programming the Intoxilyzer 5000
EN.
The Intoxilyzer testing room is enclosed. Officer Dahlinger is not distracted from
the singular task of preparing for breath testing. The monitoring of Mr. Broadfoot and
the programming of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN are all part of that process.
Most importantly there is no visible evidence of a belch.
The purpose of the monitoring is to eliminate the risk of mouth alcohol affecting
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the breath testing results. If there is no evidence of an event introducing mouth alcohol
and the breath test samples correlate within .02, there is no factual basis to believe that
the monitoring was insufficient.
In asking the Court to consider the scientific reliability of the Intoxilyzer, Mr.
Broadfoot introduces an issue which was not before the Hearing Examiner and is
specifically not supported by the Administrative Record. The Idaho Court has recently
rejected this argument in the Administrative License Suspension setting, Bell v. Idaho
Transp. Dept., 151 Idaho 659, 262 P.3d 1030 (2011).

Mr. Broadfoot suggests that a qualitative analysis of Officer Dahlinger's
monitoring of Mr. Broadfoot is appropriate. However, the Court does not engage in a
piecemeal qualitative analysis. Instead the Court looks at the Record as a whole, not an
analysis of the various components of the monitoring to determine the sufficiency of the
whole.
It is inappropriate to use a qualitative analysis, for example a separation analysis

to determine the nature of specific materials, when the legal standard is to consider the
Record as a whole.

When Mr. Broadfoot suggests that if other facts were weighed

properly there would be a different result, Mr. Broadfoot is simply arguing that the Court
should substitute it's judgment for that of the Hearing Examiner.
Instead the Court's factual review requires a consideration of whether a
reasonable person would find such facts sufficient to support the decision made,
A1asterson, at 627.

Neither, is this case factually similar to State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d
225 (Ct. App. 1999) nor is State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App.
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2006) applicable here.

The review of the circumstances of breath alcohol testing are case and fact
specific. Generalizations about decisions which do not discuss the driver's burden are not
applicable here.

However, the sufficiency of Officer Dahlinger's monitoring of Mr.

Broadfoot would be found acceptable considering DeFranco. Clearly, the monitoring by
Officer Dahlinger in a closed room, in close physical proximity to Mr. Broadfoot,
recorded for the Court's review more than meets the required standard.
Interestingly absent from Mr. Broadfoot's analysis is the fact that the entirety of
the monitoring period is recorded and able to be viewed by the Court. The Court does
not have to rely upon the testimony of Officer Dahlinger or a second officer, (Wilkinson
v. State, Dept. of Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680 (2011)) to determine the
circumstances of the monitoring. Clearly there is no evidence of an event which would
introduce mouth alcohol into Mr. Broadfoot's breath sample.
Mr. Broadfoot's arguments nonwithstanding the District Court did not engage in
the statutory construction of a new version of the IBASOPs. Neither are the revisions of
the IBASOP substantially different than the previous versions. Statutory construction is
not necessary in order to determine that the Hearing Examiner's conclusions are based
upon substantial evidence in the Record. 7
There is no change in the fifteen minute requirement nor is there a change in the
requirement that Officer Dahlinger use his senses to determine whether an event occurred
which could have introduced mouth alcohol.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance, Masterson v. Idaho
Dept. of Transp. 150 Idaho 126, 244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010), citing Kinney v. Tupperware Co., 117 Idaho
765, 769, 792 P.2d 330, 334 (1990).
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The District Court is not determining what specific language in the Standard
Operating Procedures mean, instead the District Court is determining what specific facts
mean. The District Court simply weighs those facts differently than weighed by the
Hearing Examiner. The entirety of the rubric of Mr. Broadfoot's argument is premised
on the Hearing Examiner having ignored evidence that the District Court did not ignore.
Mr. Broadfoot fails to show why the Hearing Examiner weighing of the evidence was
unreasonable. All that is offered is that should the Court consider different facts and
upon placing weight on those other facts, a different conclusion than the Hearing
Examiner is available.
Mr. Broadfoot also makes a umque analysis suggesting that when the Court
considers the 'new' Standard Operating Procedures and the case law that existed before
the new Standard Operating Procedures that there is a 'higher' standard of monitoring.
The District Court here makes findings which are simply alternative findings
looking at the same evidence as considered by the Hearing Examiner. That is not the
Court's role. The Court's role is to determine whether it was reasonable to consider those
facts and whether those facts support the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner, lvfasterson
at 627.

The Court's role is not to weigh those facts differently than the Hearing

Examiner.
Clearly, the Administrative Record of the Department supports the conclusion of
the Hearing Examiner that a sufficient monitoring period occurred.

III.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Broadfoot failed to meet his burden pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A(7) to show
that the breath alcohol testing was not performed in conformity with I.C. § 18-8004(4)
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and the Standard Operating Procedures of the Idaho State Police.
The Hearing Examiner's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
Record as a whole.
The Hearing Examiner's decision should be affirmed and Mr. Broadfoot's driving
privileges should be suspended for ninety days.
DATED this

day of May, 2012.
Edwin L. Litteneker
Special Deputy Attorney General
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I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that a true
And correct copy of the foregoing
Document was:
----'-_ Mailed by regular first class mail,
And deposited in the United States
Post Office
Sent by facsimile and mailed by
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Deposited in the United States
Post Office
_ _ Sent by Federal Express, overnight
Delivery
Hand delivered
To:
Deborah L. McCormick
McCormick Law Office, PLLC
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Brian D. Thie
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Moscow. Idaho 83843
On this

day of May, 2012.

Edwin L. Litteneker
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